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Initial Statement 
This is a case of exceptional importance to victims of violence targeted 
through the internet. Petitioner Matthew Herrick seeks rehearing en banc because 
the Panel’s Summary Order endorses the dangerous status quo that multi-million- 
and billion-dollar internet companies are entitled to blanket immunity from 
liability for their intentional, knowing, and negligent facilitation of real-world 
violence and harassment. The danger posed to the public safety by Apps like 
Grindr is a question of exceptional importance that merits en banc review. 
Grindr intentionally, knowingly, and negligently facilitated the targeting, 
stalking, and assault of Herrick by a user of its App. Herrick's fact pattern is not 
unique, and the numbers of people who suffer real world damage from internet 
stalking is only growing. The National Center for Victims of Crime estimates that 
stalkers target 7.5 Million Americans annually.1 In this day and age, almost all 
stalking is aided by technology.  The Panel's Summary Order ("Summary Order") 
affirming the District Court's dismissal holds that victims of internet violence have 
                                               
 
1 See, Chanta Da Silva, Police Fined This 19-Year Old For Wasting Their Time 
With Stalking Complaints - Then She Was Killed, Newsweek, April 10, 2019, 
available at https://www.newsweek.com/police-fined-19-year-old-wasting-their-
time-stalking-complaints-then-she-was-1392114. 
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no recourse when an internet company, often the only one capable of stopping the 
harm, refuses. Law enforcement often isn't a recourse, due to overburdened law 
enforcers' inability to deal with sophisticated crimes involving tech and anonymity. 
And the Summary Order says the courts aren't a resource for victims either. 
Grindr was in the exclusive position of control to stop the attack its App 
directed at Herrick. Grindr's competitors quickly did spring to action to help when 
their Apps were also used against Herrick. But Grindr did nothing, even after 
Herrick desperately pleaded for help approximately 50 times. The Summary Order 
is an endorsement of Grindr's inaction. 
The rapid spread of the Internet of Things (IOT), where interactive computer 
services have intimate access to every aspect of our private and professional lives 
is only going to worsen this threat. Already, interactive AI devices like Alexa are 
finding their way into our homes and soon to follow, self-driving cars into our 
garages. The Court should grant en banc review because of the seriousness of this 
growing threat. 
En banc review is also warranted because the Summary Order conflicts with 
FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016). Consideration by 
the full court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity with LeadClick and 
reconcile the summary order with other circuits. Thus, this case satisfies the 
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criteria laid out in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(b) for a rehearing en 
banc. 
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Introduction 
Every one of us is a moment away from crossing paths with somebody hell-
bent on our destruction. The anonymity, convenience, accessibility and force-
multiplying nature of the internet makes it simple to attack somebody else 
remotely. The Summary Order endorses an overbroad reading of the 
Communications Decency Act § 230 (CDA) that allows internet companies to 
escape accountability when they intentionally, knowingly, or negligently facilitate 
stalking, rape, and murder. At all times in this case, Grindr had control over its 
App and could have stopped the harm. But it ignored all pleas for help from 
Herrick whose life was constantly interrupted – as many as 23 times a day -- by 
strangers coming in-person expecting to have sex with him. Grindr only finally 
responding when sued, but even then claimed it lacked the ability to stop malicious 
use of its product even though its competitors quickly could and did. 
The threat to the public safety posed by Apps like Grindr, which users have 
successfully, indisputably used to commit domestic violence, stalking, rape, 
murder, and child molestation is an issue of exceptional importance that warrants 
en banc review by this Court. Rehearing en banc is justified because, among other 
reasons: 
1. The threat to the public safety posed by Apps like Grindr is a question 
of exceptional importance 
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2. The Summary Order conflicts with this Court's precedents and other 
circuits' decisions, and 
3. The Summary Order gets facts wrong. 
The Summary Order reduces everything to third party content - without 
elucidating any clear theory of why this is so - and avoids difficult questions. But 
human beings are not content, and the violence that Apps and companies like 
Grindr knowingly and negligently facilitate against women, men, and members of 
the LGBTQ community is real. This Court should grant rehearing en banc given 
the seriousness of this public safety threat. 
I. The Threat to the Public Safety Posed by Apps that Facilitate Violence 
is a Question of Exceptional Importance 
An En Banc rehearing is appropriate because of the exceptional importance 
of the question whether internet companies enjoy immunity for acts of stalking, 
rape, and murder they intentionally, knowingly or negligently facilitate through 
products and services they exclusively control. Under the Summary Order's 
reasoning, immunity under the CDA is absolute and covers all causes of action. 
The question of whether the CDA grants de facto absolute immunity for internet 
companies for real world violence facilitated by their products and services is one 
of exceptional importance because it's a matter of life and death for many. 
But even if this Court believes that the very real, growing harm to victims of 
internet targeted physical violence isn't a question of exceptional importance to the 
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public safety, rehearing en banc is warranted by the Summary Order's conflict with 
its decision in FTC v. LeadClick. 
II. The Summary Order Conflicts with FTC v. LeadClick 
A. Under FTC v LeadClick Knowing Control of a Deceptive Harm 
Eliminates CDA Immunity 
In 2016, this Court eliminated CDA §230 immunity for defendants who 
knowingly fail to exercise control over deceptive content on their platforms when 
they have control.2 
LeadClick was an internet company that sold advertising space on fake news 
web sites.3 When the FTC sued LeadClick for its deceptive advertising, appellant 
LeadClick argued that CDA §230 shielded it from liability because it was third 
parties – and not LeadClick – that created the deceptive content. This Court 
rejected that argument, eliminating CDA limited immunity not just for the original 
creators of deceptive content, but also for those who knowingly control the 
deceptive content: 
[W]e conclude that a defendant acting with knowledge of 
deception who either directly participates in that 
deception or has the authority to control the deceptive 
practice of another, but allows the deceptions to proceed, 
                                               
 
2 See FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2016), 
3 Id. at 162-66.  
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engages, through its own actions, in a deceptive act or 
practice that causes harm to consumers.4 
(emphasis in original). 
LeadClick emphasizes that a defendant with authority to control deceptive 
activity on its platform can be held liable for the harms resulting from that 
deception. LeadClick held that the failure to exercise control over known deceptive 
content or conduct renders an interactive computer service (ICS) an information 
content provider (ICP) as to the deceptive content it controls, and therefore it is not 
entitled to CDA limited immunity.5 
The Summary Order doesn't explain why the FTC v LeadClick holding 
doesn't apply to Herrick. Just like LeadClick, Grindr was fully aware of the 
deceptive and malicious use they facilitated with their App. Herrick told them 
almost 50 times. Grindr was in control of a situation it knew about and could easily 
end. And instead did nothing. 
The Summary Order conflicts with LeadClick's reasonable, common sense 
interpretation of the scope of CDA limited immunity by recognizing that those 
with authority to control an online platform are responsible for the harm if, as here, 
they instead looked the other way when the could have easily stopped it.  
                                               
 
4 Id. at 170. 
5 Id. at 176. 
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Disregarding LeadClick, the Summary Order adopts the District Court's 
view that “[w]hile the creation of the impersonating profiles may be sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous, Grindr did not create the profiles.”6 That may or not be 
true, there's been no discovery or expert testimony in this case, but it misses the 
point. Grindr controlled its App --  there is nothing in the Complaint that alleges 
otherwise -- and it knowingly and negligently facilitated a harm  that it was on 
notice of and that it could easily stop. The Summary Order conflicts with 
LeadClick because, among other things, it fails to acknowledge LeadClick holding 
that control over a real world, non-publication tort harm moves a case outside the 
realm of CDA limited immunity.   
In LeadClick the non-publication tort harm was essentially consumer fraud.7 
Likewise, in Herrick's case, the claims relate to product liability, intentional torts, 
negligence, and deceptive business practices. This Court should grant rehearing en 
banc because the Summary Order conflicts with LeadClick. 
B. The Summary Order Doesn't Follow LeadClick's Analysis 
LeadClick rejects guaranteed immunity for an internet company simply 
because “it ‘enabled computer access by multiple users to a computer server by 
                                               
 
6 Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F.Supp.3d 579, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
7 LeadClick 838 F.3d at 176. 
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routing consumers” from one place to another.8 Instead, Leadclick, among other 
things, looks at the purpose and use of an online product or service and how that 
squares with congressional intent. Does it live up to Congress’ desire to promote 
the “‘the availability of educational and informational cultural resources to our 
citizens’ and to offer a forum of true diversity of political discourse, unique 
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity[?]”9 Stalking, rape, and murder are notably absent from this list. 
When Congress passed the CDA, it only intended to empower simple 
websites and bulletin boards to moderate passive content on their site without 
getting sued all the time for defamation because of trash talk, or for exercising 
control over uploaded porn.10 Two decades ago Congress didn't foresee the danger 
that Apps like Grindr loaded with geolocating and targeting functionality posed to 
the public. In 1995, Congress wasn't considering computer functionality that 
causes violence in the real world. For this reason alone the Court should grant en 
banc review to give this serious issue the careful consideration it merits. 
                                               
 
8 LeadClick 838 F.3d at 174. 
9 Id.at 176. 
10 See Appellants Opening Brief ("AOB"), at pp. 25-27 (Appeal Dkt. 53) 
(discussing the legislative intent of the CDA). 
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Additionally, under LeadClick, a defendant has the burden of establishing its 
ICS status, something Grindr never has done.11 And LeadClick recognizes that a 
computer product or service may be an ICS in some contexts but not others.12 The 
Summary Order doesn't analyze any of this. 
Thus, this Court should grant rehearing en banc to resolve the conflict 
between the Summary Order and LeadClick. 
C. The Summary Order Doesn't Address that CDA Immunity is an 
Affirmative Defense 
CDA limited immunity is an affirmative defense for which the defense 
carries the burden of proof.13 Dismissing well pleaded claims on the basis of CDA 
limited immunity is only proper if the defense is plain from the face of the 
complaint.14 The Summary Order doesn't analyze the law on this point despite the 
                                               
 
11 See Leadclick 838 F.3d at 175-76. (discussing Leadclick’s failure to show it was 
an ICS).   
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., id.; Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
CDA limited immunity is an affirmative defense and that "[a]ffirmative defenses 
do not justify dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6); litigants need not try to plead around 
defenses."); AOB at 18. 
14 See Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) 
("Although “[p]reemption under the Communications Decency Act is an 
affirmative defense, . . . it can still support a motion to dismiss if the statute's 
barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”). 
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fact this was Herrick's lead argument in his opening brief. 15 And given that both 
the CDA’s text and the case law are clear that CDA limited immunity does not 
apply to non-publication torts, it makes sense that it should be an affirmative 
defense.16 Because the factual questions are complex, and are not all reduceable to 
third party content under some unarticulated theory of distinguishing first party 
content from third party content from conduct, and non-publication torts from 
publication torts. The complexity of the factual issues is improper for the motion to 
dismiss stage, and the Court should grant rehearing en banc to explain where the 
procedural law stands when it comes to the exceptionally important question of 
whether CDA immunity is an affirmative defense. Because the consequences of 
granting CDA limited immunity at the motion to dismiss stage instead of as an 
affirmative defense leads to courts getting facts wrong because they don't have the 
benefit of discovery and adversarial proceeding below. The result is plaintiffs with 
profound harms are deprived of their day in court. And that's what happened here. 
                                               
 
15(See AOB at pp.18 – 21.). 
16 See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 854 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing failure to warn claims); City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 
363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010), ("[S]ubsection (c)(1) does not create an ‘immunity’ of 
any kind. It limits who may be called the publisher of information that appears 
online" (citations omitted).); McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 
533, 537 (D. Md. 2016) (stating the CDA 230 does not immunize defendants from 
all product liability claims.).  
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D. The Summary Order Gets Facts Wrong 
The Summary Order relies on mistaken facts not in the record. Herrick 
alleges in his Complaint that in November 2015, he “removed his Grindr profile 
because the relationship had become more serious and exclusive.” The Panel and 
the District Court both assume that Herrick “deactivated” his account and never 
used the App again.17 This is mistaken. “[R]emoving a profile” from view on one’s 
phone and “deactivating an account” are different things. One can remove an App 
from a phone, without deleting an account. 
Herrick never alleges – because it isn't true – that he’d stopped using Grindr 
before the abuse began and never used it again. Identifying, monitoring, and 
reporting the impersonating accounts required that he use a Grindr account. 
Grindr’s own attorneys said the best way for Grindr to observe the problem was for 
a user to flag the problem account(s), an impossibility for a non-user.18 
This mistaken factual speculation renders much of the Summary Order's 
reasoning problematic because it depends on this assumption. The Summary 
Order's proximate cause analysis assumes that Herrick stopped using Grindr in 
                                               
 
17 Summary Order at 8; District Court Order at pp. 2, 23 (Joint Appendix ("JA") at 
pp.191, 212. (Appeal Dkt. 43.)). 
18(Tr. of TRO Hearing (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2017) (JA at p. 150.). 
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2015.19 And it used this assumption as a basis for affirming the dismissal of 
Herrick's claims for:  fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, 
deceptive business practices, and false advertising.20 
The Summary Order states: 
It is uncontested that Herrick was no longer a user of the 
app at the time the harassment began; accordingly, any 
location information was necessarily provided by 
Herrick’s ex-boyfriend.21 
This is problematic not only because it overlooks that Herrick was basically 
coerced into using the App to plead with Grindr for help. It ignores the real 
possibility that readily available geo-location “spoofing” software was used to 
target Herrick. Geo-spoofing is a common and well-known phenomena, and both 
Apple's App Store and Google's Play store contain Apps that can be downloaded 
for this purpose to work with Grindr.22 Grindr knew, or should have known, about 
this danger, yet did nothing to prevent it.  
                                               
 
19 (Summary Order at 7 (Appeal Dkt. 156)). 
20 (Id.). 
21 (Id. at 5). 
22 See Tim Fisher, How to Fake a GPS Location on Your Phone, Lifewire.com Feb. 
9, 2019, available at https://www.lifewire.com/fake-gps-location-4165524 (last 
visited April 10, 2019). 
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This highlights crucial questions as to whether Grindr is defectively 
designed because it permits known dangers such as Geo-Spoofing, and also 
demonstrates why Herrick's failure to warn, and other claims should never have 
been dismissed on speculative facts not in the record relating to when Herrick was 
and was not using Grindr. Ultimately, these claims don't all turn on whether 
Herrick was using Grindr at a given time, but rather if Herrick was a victim of a 
dangerous product whose manufacturer who had a duty to protect against known 
dangers under its control. This puts Herrick's case squarely under the rubric of such 
cases like the Ninth Circuit's Doe v. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016). 
If this case had proceeded to discovery, and was before this Court on an 
appeal of a Summary Judgement, the Court would have been aware of the fact that 
Herrick had to report Grindr's facilitation of his stalking, and attempt to stop it, by 
downloading Grindr for the sole purpose of pleading with Grindr for help.23 But it 
granted a Summary Order affirming a grant of CDA limited immunity at the 
motion to dismiss stage. And in so doing, it made mistaken factual assumptions on 
a matter of life and death to victims of internet targeted violence. That the 
Summary Order is premised on mistaken factual assumptions warrants en banc 
                                               
 
23 See AOB at p. 12 (“[f]rom November 2016 through January 2017, Mr. Herrick 
reported the impersonation and stalking approximately 50 times to Grindr”.). 
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review because the threat to public safety this case involves is a question of 
exceptional importance. 
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Conclusion 
Millions of Americans are stalked annually. It is a question of exceptional 
importance whether internet companies enjoy absolute immunity when they 
knowingly facilitate stalking, harassment, and violence that they can easily stop 
with the exclusive control their platforms have over these targeted crimes. The 
Summary Order conflicts with this Court's precedent in FTC v. LeadClick Media, 
LLC. And the Summary Order can't be reconciled with all the decisions that hold 
CDA limited immunity is an affirmative defense. Finally, the Summary Order is 
premised on mistaken factual assumptions. Thus, the Court should grant rehearing 
en banc. 
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